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ABSTRACT
Critics of foreign aid programs argue that these funds oftensupport corrupt governments
and inefficient bureaucracies. Supportersargue that foreign aid can be used to reward good
governments. This paper documents that there is no evidence that less corrupt governments
receive more foreign aid. On the contrary, according to somemeasures of corruption, more
corrupt governments receive more aid. Also, we could not find any evidence that an increase in
foreign aid reduces corruption. In summary, the answer to the question posed in the title is "no."
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The differences in well-being across the world are staggering: income per capita
in the U.S. is sixty times larger than in Ethiopia and about fifty times larger than in Mali.1
Not surprisingly, there is a demand for foreign aid programs.
International programs to alleviate poverty include bilateral aid from richer to
poorer countries, multilateral aid from international organizations, grants at below market
rates, technical assistance and debt forgiveness programs, just to name a few. The
rhetoric which accompanies these programs is that they serve the purpose not only of
reducing poverty, but also of rewarding good policies and efficient and honest
governments. Donor countries and international organizations argue that their aid
policies are meant to be selective and favor reforming government. The World Bank, for
instance, has recently discussed more often and more openly the issue of how to enhance
"good governance", where the latter means, in particular, low levels of corruption of the
bureaucracy and of the officials of the receiving countries.2 The critics of these programs
argue instead that, contrary to the more or less sincere intentions of the donors, corrupt
governments receive just as much aid as less corrupt ones. Furthermore, often financial
assistance does not reach the really needy in the developing country, but, instead, is
wasted in inefficient public consumption.3 Many critics make an even stronger
argument, namely that not only are corrupt governments not discriminated against in the
flow of international assistance, but in fact foreign aid fosters corruption by increasing the
size of resources fought over by interest groups and factions.4 A related argument put
forward by Casella and Eichengreen (1996) suggest that foreign aid may be
counterproductive if it delays the adoption of stabilization policies and policy reforms.
'This figures already take into account difference in purchasing power. Data from the World Bank
Development Indicators for 1995.
2
See,for instance, World Bank (1997).
See World Bank (1998) for an excellent assessment of the effect of foreign aid.
"This argument is spelled out more generally in Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999).
3Given the amount of press that this discussion has received, it is somewhat
surprising that the relationship between foreign assistance and domestic corruption has
not received more systematic attention. This is precisely the goal of this paper. In
particular, we ask four questions: First, do less corrupt governments receive more aid?
Second, do different donors differ in their willingness to discriminate against corrupt
governments? Third, does foreign aid reduce or foster corruption? Fourth, do commercial
private flows like FDI behave differently with respect to corruption with relative to
official aid?
Regarding the first question, we find that there is no evidence that bilateral or
multilateral aid goes disproportionally to less corrupt governments. In fact, if anything,
we find the opposite: according to some measures of aid, more corrupt governments
receive more foreign aid than less corrupt ones, after controlling for several other
determinants of aid. On the second question, we uncover some interesting differences
between donors. Scandinavian countries give more to less corrupt governments, while
the U.S. appears to give more assistance to more corrupt governments, even though this
donorfavors democracies over dictatorships. Multilateral aid, namely aid from
international organizations, seems to pay no attention to the level of corruption of the
receiving country. Therefore, it would seem that the rhetoric on "good governance" does
not influence aid flows from multilateral organizations. In fact we could not find any
significant difference between multilateral aid and total bilateral aid in terms of their
sensitivity to the level of corruption of the receiving countries.
On the third question we find some evidence that indeed FDI behave differently
than official aid. Private flows seem to pay some attention to corruption, at least more
than official aid.
The fourth question is by far the hardest to answer for several reasons. First of all,
data on corruption not only are imperfect by their nature, but they also have been
collected for large sample of countries only very recently. Therefore, it is quite difficult
4to measure changes in corruption levels to be associated with changes in received aid.
Second, it is not quite clear what the determinants of corruption are, thus it is unclear
what one should control for in evaluating the effect of aid on corruption.5 Given these
two critical problems, results on this issue should be taken with extreme caution. In any
case, we could not find any evidence that foreign aid reduces corruption.
This paper is at the crossroads of two strands of literature. One is the recent
revival of work on the determinants and effects of foreign aid, summarized in World
Bank (1998). The empirical work on aid has established three results: 1) foreign aid is
most often used for largely wasteful public consumption [Boone (1994; 1996)1; 2)
countries following good policies are helped by foreign assistance and aid, but the
probability that a country adopts "good" policies is not influenced by the amount of
foreign aid received [Burnside and Dollar (1997)]; and 3) donor countries disburse
foreign aid largely as a function of strategic and geo-political considerations, rather than
real needs of the receiving countries [Alesina and Dollar (1998)].
The second strand of the literature is the one on the measurement and
consequences of corruption, and includes the empirical work by Mauro (1995), Knack
and Keefer (1995), Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1995), Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder
(1998a) and Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1998). This empirical literature has
made some progress in providing various measures of corruption for samples of many
countries. The evidence points to the negative consequences of corruption on growth.6
Thus, if our results on foreign aid stand, they suggest that foreign aid may increase, or, at
best, has no effect on corruption. It follows that foreign aid does not improve growth by
improving the quality of government.
For some work on the determinants of corruption in cross-country samples see Ades and DiTella (1997),
Braun and DiTella (1999), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997).
6Forgeneral studies of corruption see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Tanzi (1994); a recent survey
of the literature is provided in Bardan (1997).
5Needless to say, corruption is very difficult to measure. In this paper, rather than
providing a new index or choosing one from the available list, we check our results using
a large number of cross-country measures of corruption. While we would not trust 100
percent any specific measure of corruption, and thus any result based on such a specific
measure, we feel relatively confident that if a certain pattern of results is consistent for
every measure of corruption, then one can be more comfortable with the empirical
finding.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the questions we are
interested in. Section 3 presents our data. Section 4 discusses empirically whether the
level of corruption in receiving countries influences the level of aid received. Section 5
briefly discusses FDI. Section 6 attempts to evaluate whether more aid received by a
country fosters corruption. The last section concludes.
2. Questions, Data and Methodology
The first question we ask is very simple: do corrupt governments receive more or
less multilateral and bilateral aid, after controlling for other determinants ofaidflows?
Almost every analysis of foreign aid face an almost insurmountable problem of
reverse causality. For instance, the fact that poorer countries receive more aid does not
mean that aid causes poverty, but that donors target poor countries. The fact that
countries with poorly developed institutions receive more aid (if they do) may mean that
donors are trying to help build institutions, not that aid is bad for good governance.
This problem is less serious for corruption: it is hard to argue that aid should go to
more corrupt countries to help reduce corruption. In fact, international organizations and
bilateral donors have often made the opposite claim, namely that they should try to
discriminate against corruption. Therefore, if one finds that more corrupt governments
6receive more foreign aid, one could safely interpret this finding as a serious failure in the
decision process allocating aid amongst developing countries. An important caveat is,
however, that measures of corruption are generally very correlated to many other
characteristics of countries, like poverty and poor institutional development, which may
be targeted by donors. Obviously, one may control for all of the above, (as we try to do)
but these controls may not solve the problem completely.
The second question we ask is whether there is a difference between donors,
namely whether multilateral donors such as international organizations pay more
attention to corruption and/or whether there are signicant dfferences amongst donor
countries.
Aid policies of bilateral donors may be influenced by a host of factors which have
very little to do with corruption. For instance, Alesina and Dollar (1998) show that
colonial ties and political alliances are major determinants of bilateral aid flows, after
controlling for many other factors.7 Thus, a donor country will give disproportionately to
its former colonies regardless of their level of corruption. However, there might be
significant differences amongst donor countries. The same authors document that
Scandinavian countries target "well-deserving" recipients more than any of the other
donors. Below we investigate if this is the case with reference to corruption. Since
international organizations should be less directly affected by the colonial history of the
recipients, international alliances and geopolitical considerations, one may expect that
multilateral aid flows may be more responsive to the characteristics of policies and
institutions of receiving countries. In other words, one may expect that multilateral aid
should penalize corruption more than bilateral aid.
The third question is whether or not private flows and official aid react differently
to measures of institutional development.
For a discussion of previous empirical findings on this point, see Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and the
literature reviewed in World Bank (1998)
7Given the proven negative effects of corruption on overall investment we would
expect that foreign direct investment flow would be sensitive to high corruption. Most
foreign direct investment is at least partially irreversible and should therefore be sensitive
to uncertainties in high corruption environment. However, the relationship between
private flows and corruption may be more complicated. For instance, if foreign investors
become part of the circle of insiders that profit most from corrupt arrangements they will
prefer such countries.. This is a similar argument as in the case of FDI and import
substitution: to the extent that foreign direct investors can share in the profits of
protected markets they will prefer countries that is have high import barriers and actively
lobby in favor for their maintenance. This particular concern might be smaller in the case
of short term and easily reversible private capital flows. On the other hand, by the same
token, such flows would be less sensitive to corruption anyway.
The forth question is whetherforeign aid increases or decreases corruption. Why
this question is interesting is self-evident, particularly in light of the results which
inversely relate corruption and institutional quality to economic growth.
In the United States, an influential argument often made is that both direct U.S.
aid and indirect aid through multilateral organizations is counterproductive and therefore
implies an unnecessary burden on the taxpayers. In the political rhetoric, often aid
programs to poverty-stricken regions or countries are bunched up with criticism of
"rescue packages" for crisis countries, like Mexico in 1994, or Brazil and Russia recently.
Our focus is on foreign aid, so we have nothing to offer on the second issue.
3.Data
Corruptionmeasures are available from various sources. Most of them are risk
assessments by private companies which sell their expertise to multinational companies
and investors. With the increasing interest in the developmental consequences of
8corruption, international agencies have also started to monitor corruption and have
developed new measures. We use seven indicators of corruption from six different
sources. All these indices are coded such that a higher number means less corruption.
The most frequently used measure of corruption in academic research is one
compiled from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This is the only measure
which has yearly data since 1982 and covers the largest number of countries. Thus, our
variable constructed using this index, CORRICRG, is defined as follows: A low score
means that "high government officials are likely to demand special payments" and
"illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels" in the form of "bribes
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy
protection, or loans".8
Our second source of corruption data is a survey originally conducted for the
World Development Report 1997, and which was subsequently expanded at the
University of Basel.9 The data is derived from surveys of the private sector in 74
countries. We use two indicators of corruption from this source. The first indicator
CORRWDR1 is based on a question of how frequently firms have to pay bribes in order
to do business. The second indicator CORRWDR2 is based on a question which asked
entrepreneurs to rate comparatively the importance of different obstacles to doing
business. The correlation between the first and the third indicator is not perfect since a
high level of corruption does not necessarily mean that this is also a major problem for
investors. Many observers have commented that not all forms of corruption are equally
harmful.'° Some commentators go as far as suggesting that some form of bribery system
may increase efficiency in the bureaucracy.
See Knack and Keefer (1995).
See Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1998b) for a detailed description of the data. The data set is available
on the net at www.unibas.ch/wwz/wifor/survey/
'°Seee.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
9The third source of corruption data is from Standard and Poors. The variable
CORRSAP reflects "losses and costs" to firms due to corruption.1.
The fourth source is Business International (incorporated into the Economist
Intelligence Unit) and first used in Mauro (1995). This is the oldest data we consider, it
is an average of the rating from 1980-1983. The indicator reflects experts assessments
on: "The degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable
payments".
The fifth source of corruption data is the World Competitiveness Yearbook by
the Institute for Management Development (IMD) in Geneva. It includes a measure of
"improper practices such as bribing and corruption".
Finally, Transparency International, a non-profit organization dedicated to
combating corruption has provided a summary indicator of corruption. CORRTI is based
on a poli of poiis, that is the scores of 5 to 10 surveys, depending on the country, were
aggregated into an summary indicator of corruption. This summary index was first
calculated in 1996 and became widely cited in the press. It was also often criticized
because it initially included surveys of very different quality. For the 1998 indicator the
methodology was revised and the summary indicator was improved.t2
All these indices and their sources are listed in Table 1 together with all the other
variables which we use in this paper. Even though each of the seven indicators gets at the
phenomena of corruption from a slightly different angle, they are highly correlated as
shown by the correlation matrix in Table 2. Of the 28 cross correlations, 22 are above
0.5; 18 are above 0.6, and 10 are above 0.7. These relatively high correlations provide
some confidence in the measures of corruption since most of them were compiled by
different institutions using very different experts and survey methodologies.
We thank Daniel Kaufmann for sharing this data with us.
10Our objective is to test whether foreign aid is allocated to countries with less
corruption. We estimate the effect of corruption on foreign aid controlling for other
determinants of the allocation of foreign aid such as the level of income of recipient
countries, their size, economic policies, political system and historic or political links
with donors. In our choice of control variables we largely follow Alesina and Dollar
(1998). These variables include: a) colonial history of the receiving country; b) a proxy
for political alliance, constructed using the frequency of cases in which the receiving
country has voted in the United Nations in the same way as the donor; c) measures of
policies and economic conditions of the receiving countries, such as a measure of
openness and, of course, per capita income; and, d) measures of institutional development
of the receiving country. The detailed description and sources of control variables are
given in Table 1.
A few comments on these controls are appropriate. First, UN votes are often
considered fairly irrelevant, from the point of view of international politics. However,
patterns of UN votes are probably highly correlated with patterns of alliances and
commonality of interests. There is actually a fairly high dispersion in vote patterns even
amongst Western democracies and their allies. The traditional East/West cutting line was
not the only relevant cleavage in UN votes. Second, it is not a priori clear whether a
receiving country "buys" foreign aid by its voting pattern in the UN or whether foreign
aid "rewards" past votes. This is an issue which we do not explore here.'3
Our measure of openness is taken from Sachs and Warner (1995). This index has
been criticized as a "black box"14 which includes many indicators of "good" versus "bad"
2The1998 indicator is actually includes the assessment of the previous three years also. Detailed
descriptions and the indicators can be viewed at http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/ 'Fora more extensive discussion of this point see Alesina and Dollar (1998) 'Acountry is classified as closed if at least one of the five following criteria apply: (i) non tariff barriers
cover 40% or more of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are 40% or more, (iii) the black market exchange rate is
depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate, (iv) the country has a socialist economic
system, (v) the state holds a monopoly on major exports.
11policies which have little to do with openness per se.'5 However for our purposes this
summary indicator seems appropriate, because we are not especially interested in
openness, per se, but more in an indicator of "policy stance". In fact, this index is better
for us than a simple measure of trade openness like export over GDP for instance,
because donors should target good policies in general rather than openness strictly
defined.
Finally, measures of institutional development (namely whether the receiving
country is a democracy or not) are used since international organizations and donors may
discriminate against certain types of non-democratic governments. This point is
emphasized and analyzed in detail in Alesina and Dollar (1998).
4. Aid and Corruption
4.1 Total Aid
We begin with a measure of total multilateral and bilateral aid received by
developing countries. First of all we need to decide how to "scale" the total amount of
foreign aid received by a country. Standard scaling procedures are aid over GDP or per
capital aid (aid over population). A third possibility which is of interest for a discussion
of corruption is aid over government spending. The last one captures how much of the
public resources are received for free, rather than raised domestically or with commercial
international loans. This measure may be the closest in spirit to the "Voracity Effect"
discussed by Lane and Tornell (1996, 1999). The idea is that when a windfall of public
resources is obtained in a community then lobbying, redistributive conflicts and
corruption may turn that windfall into a social loss. In any case, we will present results
using all three measures of aid. As we shall see, results are sometimes different in
interesting manners.
For a particularly pointed criticism, see Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999).
12We begin with some impressionistic figures. Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot a measure of
corruption, ICRG, on the vertical axis and official development assistance from OECD
countries in per capita terms as a share of GDP and as a share of government spending.
All of the three picture essentially show a cloud with virtually no pattern. Remember that
because of the way this corruption index is constructed, a higher number means less
corruption, therefore an upward sloping line would indicate that less corrupted countries
receive more aid. There is no indication of an upward sloping line in any of the three
pictures.
Table 3 has six columns, two for each definition of aid and uses the ICRG
measure of corruption. The first column of each pair includes a "minimalist" regression
with only a measure of per capita income, of population and an indicator variable for
Israel. In fact, it is well known that because of political reasons linked to the Middle East
conflict, this country receives a large amount of aid, especially from the U.S and in per
capita terms.'6 The second column includes our richer specification. We use two
specifications because the first one can be run on more countries, and the problem of
degrees of freedom is important for some of the measures of corruption, discussed
below.
Remember that a negative sign on the corruption variable implies that more
corrupt governments receive more foreign aid.In all six of the regressions, the
coefficient is indeed negative, although it is statistically significant only in the two
regressions for aid over government spending and in one of aid/GDP. These results
immediately suggest two observations. The first one is that there is no evidence
whatsoever that more corrupt governments are discriminated by foreign donors. The
second is that if one looks at Aid/GOV, in fact there is some evidence that more corrupt
governments receive more. The difference between aid/GOV and Aid/per capita is
6Inany specification without an indicator variable for Israel, the latter would appear as a large outlier,
particularly in the regressions where the right hand side is aid per capita.
13suggestive. One manifestation of corruption is may be a high tax evasion, (perhaps
unreported bribes substitute for reported taxes), a large black economy and more
generally lack of capacity or willingness of the government to collect "official" revenues.
Thus, high corruption, may imply that domestically raised public resources are low and a
higher fraction of public resources are covered by foreign aid. The values of the
coefficients in the first two column imply that, ceteris paribus, a country that is more
corrupt by one standard deviation from the mean, receives about 9 percentage points of
aid over government expenditures.
Table 4 checks the robustness of the results by considering other measures of
corruption. The table reports the t statistic on the corruption variable and the number of
observations for the six regressions of Table 3.Inother words, we changed the
corruption variable in the regressions of Table 3, and in Table 4 reported, for brevity,
only the results of the corruption variable.'7 Note that the number of observations vary
widely because of the availability of the corruption index.
Of the 42 coefficients 39 are negative and, of those, 17 are significant at standard
confidence levels, that islO per cent or better. (Remember that a negative coefficient
implies more aid to more corrupt governments). Only the remaining 3 are positive, but
they are statistically insignificant. Looking at the pattern of coefficients, we confirm the
result of the previous table, namely that the positive effect of higher corruption on aid is
stronger if aid is scaled by government spending of the receiving country.
In summary this sections shows that being less corrupt does not help with donors; if
anything it hurts!
4.2 Individual Donors
Complete results are available upon request.
14In this section we explore whether one can find significant differences in the
behavior of individual donors. Table 5canbe read as follows. We have run a TOBIT
regression in which the left-hand side is the amount of aid/per capita given by each
individual donor. We use the TOBIT procedures since there are several "zeros", namely
some donors do not give to all receiving countries.18 The controls are listed for every
regression and they are slightly different for every regressions. For instance, certain
donors do not have colonies and the indicator variable for Israel is relevant only for the
US.19
This table shows interesting cross country differences. Scandinavian countries
(plus Australia) seem to give more to less corrupt governments. The fact that Scandinavia
seems to allocated its aid "well" is consistent with the results of Alesina and Dollar
(1998)20. At the opposite extreme is the US, for which the significant negative coefficient
on the corruption variable indicates that more US foreign aid goes to more corrupt.
countries. Interestingly the political rights variable indicates that the US give relatively
more to democratic countries. A similar finding is reported by Alesina and Dollar (1998)
and these results, viewed together, suggest that the US may be more interested in
democratic institutions per se relative to the quality of government. The coefficient in the
regression of bilateral US aid shows that a country that is more corrupt (one standard
deviation from the mean) receives about 8 US dollars more aid per capita.
Table 6 is the analog of Table 5exceptthat we now have aid/government rather
than per capita aid. The results are similar to table 5.Onceagain the US and Scandinavia
are on opposite extremes of the spectrum. Figure 4 gives a picture of the relationship
between US aid and corruption. This figure plots the residuals of the US aid regression
18Jis worth noting that, actually, the number of"zeros" is not very large. Most donors give to many
receiving countries.
Following Alesina and Dollar (1998) we also added an indicator variable for Egypt. Our results are
unaffected regardless of whether or not this variable is included.
20Notethat Scandinavian countries had no colonies
15form Table 6 without the corruption variable against the latter. One can easily see a
downward relationship.
We have also estimated donor by donor regressions using other measures of
corruption. Given the relatively few number of observations in several of these, due to
the observation lost because of data availability plus the "zeros" we do not show them,
but they are available upon request.
Finally we have explored whether there are systematic differences between
multilateral and bilateral donors. As mentioned above, a priori, one might expect that
multilateral donors would be less subject to political pressures and more prone to give to
the more deserving, i.e. less corrupt countries. Estimates using the ICRG corruption
show that multilateral aid is positively correlated with corruption (using specifications (1)
and (5)inTable 3) while bilateral aid is negatively correlated with corruption. But both
coefficients are not significant at conventional levels and also this result is not robust to
changes in the measurement of the corruption indicator.21 Therefore, we conclude that
there are no large differences between multilateral organizations and bilateral donors
allocate aid. Neither seem to have targeted countries with little corruption.
5. Foreign Direct Investment and Private Capital Flows
In this brief section we investigate whether private flows respond differently to
corruption relative to official assistance. Wei (1997) argues that more corrupt countries,
ceteris paribus, receive less FDI. He uses FDI data from 7 or 8 industrialized countries to
a sample of about 40 countries, most of which are not poor developing countries. If we
21Allthese results are available upon request
16cross Wei's data on developing countries with the measures of corruption we are left with
too few degrees of freedom for a meaningful analysis.22
Table 7 reports our results on a few regressions on FDI, FDI and portfolio flows
and total private capital flows all over GDP of the receiving country. The precise
definition of all the three variables is given in Table 1. FDI is the most narrow measure
of private capital flows and is related to longer term investment that have certain qualities
of irreversibility. Therefore it is conceivable that FDI investors would be most sensitive
to corruption. The counter-argument, is that a foreign direct investor can factually
become a local entrepreneur and may be able to share in the profits of certain forms of
corruption. Such instances would mitigate the negative reaction of FDI flows to
corruption. The broader measures of private capital inflows, (including portfolio
investments and bank loans into developing countries) are less susceptible to this
particular problem since they tend to be more easily reversible and of a shorter maturity.
But, for this same reason they may also not react very strongly to corruption. Our results
on private capital flows confirm this suspicion, they document that private capital flows
react negatively to higher corruption but that this relationship is not very strong.
We present estimates for three specifications. The first one is the minimalist
specification that ensures comparability with the aid results and includes only income and
population. Looking at a plot of FDI it is clear that Singapore is a big outlier with a very
large amount of FDI over GDP. According to all indices Singapore has a very low level
of corruption. Regressions which do not eliminate this outlier would generate the
impression that FDI react negatively to corruption than they actually do, because the
result would be unduly driven by one country. Therefore in the second regression we
include an indicator variable for Singapore. Finally we present an extended specification
that includes a measure of openness, on the political system democracy and land area, a
measure of market size. We conducted a wide search for specification for the estimates
22Althoughin the end we ended up not using them, we still want to acknowledge Wei's kindness in
providing us with his data
17of private capital flows. Surprisingly many of the reasonable determinants of FDI and
other private capital flows (included variables of human capital, measures the depth of the
Financial system, measures political instability, black market premium, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, oil exporting countries, inflation and M2/GDP) were not significant.
If one compares the results of Table 7 with those of Table 3 one notes differences.
All the coefficients in Tale 7 are positive, even though none is significant at standard
confidence level.23 Table 8 is organized as Table 4, namely it reports only the t statistic on
different corruption measures and the number of observations on the regressions of Table
7. Once again, a comparison between Tables 8 and 4 reveal striking differences. In table 8
out of 42 coefficients, 30 are positive. Amongst the latter 8 are significatively positive at
standard level of significance. Several others have a t statistic above 1.5. The point we
want to push is not that there is a strong evidence that FDI react very strongly against
corruption (even though according to at least one measure of corruption, they do) but
rather that there are non trivial differences between the behavior of FDI and foreign aid.
A comparison of Table 4 and 8 is generally supportive of this claim.
6. Dynamic effects of aid on corruption
In order to measure the effects of aid on changes in corruption one would need a
long time series on corruption measures. Even if those were available, they would
probably not capture well small changes in corruption, given the nature of this variable.
Thus any attempt to answer this question has to be taken very cautiously.
In Table 9 and 10 we look at simple statistic linking aid received in the previous
period and the amount of corruption reported in a country. This exercise could only be
conducted with the ICRG corruption indicator because it is the only one that has time
23Notethat some of these coefficients would become significant if we left out the indicator variable for
Singapore.
18series data. Table 9 focuses on 5yearsperiods, Table 10 on a longer horizon. Both
tables show no evidence that aid received in previous period goes to country that are less
corrupt later on. The bold entry show cases of the reverse: namely more aid going to
countries that later on are more corrupt. Most of the entries are bold, even though the
differences are not statistically significant. In all groups the variance is very large,
therefore out of the 31 bold pairs only in 2 cases the differences are statistically
significant.
A additional problem in pursuing this analysis is that measures of corruption show
relatively small amounts of within country variations. In fact, the level of corruption may
often take generations to significatively change. We have also examined case by case
examples of large changes (up of down) of the corruption index and tried to relate them to
previous changes in foreign aid received. We did not uncover any consistent pattern
across countries. We also did not uncover signs of an increase in aid following a
reduction in the amount of measured corruption, but again data limitations have to be
kept in mind.
7 Conclusions
There are two ways of summarizing the evidence presented in this paper. A
minimalist summary would simply be that the answer to the question posed in the title is
a loud no. There is no evidence whatsoever that less corrupt countries receive more
foreign aid. This conclusion adds another piece of evidence to the view (consistent with
some previous literature) that foreign aid programs are often unsuccessful because they
are not well targeted. This "minimalist" and negative conclusion is very "robust" in the
sense in our vast exploration of the data we never found any even small or weak evidence
of a negative effect of corruption on aid.
19Beyond this result, the data are not so clear cut, but they still allow us to say
some more. For instance, it would appear that at least according to most measures,
corrupt governments actually receive more foreign aid rather than less, particularly if aid
is scaled by the size of the public sector of the receiving country. Also we found
significant differences across donor. Consistently with evidence on other variables
Scandinavian donors (the most generous in per capita terms) do reward less corrupt
receivers. On the other hand the US appear to favor democracies, but seems to pay no
attention whatsoever to quality of government of receiving countries. We find some
evidence that private flows, as opposed to official flows, do a batter job at discriminating
against more corrupt governments. Finally, we find weak indication of a "voracity effect"
of foreign aid, meaning that countries that receive more aid have tend to have higher
corruption.
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Description
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average 1975-1995
Official development assistance as a share of GNP,
average 1975-1995
Official development assistance in percent of
government expenditures, average 1975-1995
Source
The World Bank, World
Development Indicators
The World Bank, World
Development Indicators
The World Bank, World
Development Indicators
BILATERAL AID
PER CAPITA
COLSXXX
CORRBI
CORRICRG
CORRIMD
CORRSAP
CORRTI
CORRWDR1
CORRWDR2
DEMOCRACY
FDI
FDI÷P. FLOWS
OECD's bilateral aid, net per capita (constant 85$)
Number of years as a Colony of country xxx
Since 1900
Bl corruption indicator average 1980-1993, collected
by Mauro (1995),
10 (lowest corruption) 0 (highest corruption)
Corruption index from ICRG, annual surveys from 1982-
1995
6 (lowest corruption) 0 (highest corruption)
Corruption index from World Competitiveness
Yearbook, 1996, original name: improper practices such
as bribing and corruption
10 (lowest corruption) 0 (highest corruption)
Losses and costs of corruption, from Standard and
Poors 1997, redefined to:
10 (lowest corruption) 0 (highest corruption)
Corruption index from Transparency International,
survey 1997
10 (lowest corruption) 1 (highest corruption)
Level of corruption index, from survey of World
Development Report 1997, plus 5 additional surveys
6 (lowest corruption) 1 (highest corruption)
Corruption as a business obstacle, from survey of
World Development Report 1997, plus 5 additional
surveys
6 (lowest corruption) 1 (highest corruption)
Political Rights, recoded as
(7) democratic (1) autocratic government,
average 1974-1989
Net inflows of FDI (% gdp), average 1975-1995
Net direct and portfolio investment (comprises direct
investment in equity capital, reinvested earnings, and
Alesina and Dollar
(1 998),OECD
Alesina and Dollar
(1998), CIA (1996)
BI, now Economist
Intelligence Unit
International County Risk
Guide (1996),
Knack and Keefer (1995)
Institute for Management
Development, IMD
Standard and Poors
Transpanrecy
International
Brunetti, Kisunko and
Weder (1 998b)
Brunetti, Kisunko and
Weder (1998b)
Gastil (1990)
The World Bank, World
Development Indicators
The World Bank, World
Development Indicators
VARIABLE
AID PER CAPITA
AID/GOP
Al D/GOVother capital associated with intercompany transactions
and transactions with nonresidents in financial
securities (% gdp), average 1975-1995
FRDXXX Percentage of times in which the recipient has Alesina and Dollar
voted in the UN as XXX (1998),
INCOME Real GDP per capita, beginning of period Pen World Tables
OPENNESS Proportion of years in which the country is open Sachs and Warner
(1995)
PRIV. CAP. Net private capital flows consist of private debt and The World Bank, World
FLOWS nondebt flows. Private debt flows include commercial Development Indicators
bank lending, bonds, and other private credits; nondebt
private flows are foreign direct investment and portfolio
equity investment (% gdp), average 1975-1 995
YEARS AS A Number of years as colony of any Alesina and Dollar
COLONY Colonizer since 1900 (1998), CIA (1996)T
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 Table 3: Official foreign aid and corruption
Aid! Aid!
Dependent Variable:
Aid/
Log
Aid! Aid Aid
Gov Gov GNP GNP per cap. per cap.
Constant 22.95 -17.12 25.35 -21.50 17.82 -14.23
(9.66) (-1.05) (13.02) (-1.40) (13.03) (-1.33)
Log (initial income) -1.74 7.10 -1.93 8.30 -0.69 7.16
(-8.10) (2.52) (-11.07) (3.07) (-5.61) (3.80)
Log (population) -0.44 2.08 -0.60 1.13 -0.61 0.44
(-4.46) (1.29) (-7.39) (0.73) (-10.65) (0.40)
Israel 2.47 2.10 2.64 3.51 3.33 3.36
(1.84) (1.12) (2.26) (1.86) (4.02) (2.64)
Openness -0.52 -0.65 0.05
(-1.09) (-1.37) (0.14)
Political Rights 0.17 0.06 0.03
(1.76) (0.67) (0.44)
Years as a colony -0.006 0.085 0.001
(-0.95) (0.66) (0.21)
Friend of USA -0.008 -0.02 -0.002
(-0.34) (-0.86) (-0.15)
Friend of Japan -0.11 -0.05 -0.05
(-2.02) (-0.88) (-1 .53)
Log (initial income)2 -0.61 -0.69 -0.53
(-3.18) (-3.74) (-4.15)
Log (population) 2 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03
(-1.67) (-1.11) (-0.98)
Corruption -0.36 -0.39 -0.25 -0.13 -0.06 -0.05
ICRG (-2.29) (-2.73) (-2.02) (-0.99) (-0.75) (-0.51)
Adj. R2 0.56 0.72 0.68 0.74 0.62 0.72
Numberofobs. 74 63 84 69 86 70
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 Table 10: Corruption (ICRG avg. 1990-95) and previous aid (avg. 1981-95)
Aid/ Gov Aid I GNP Total Aid pcBilateral
__________ __________ Aid PC
Split by
Number of countries 72 98 101 91
Average Corruption 2.96 2.72 2.68 2.83
Average Numberofcountries 26 39 32 32
with higher than
average corruption
Average aid 30.75 8.27 31.89 27.89
number of countries 46 59 69 66
with lower than
average corruption
Average aid 23.13 6.26 32.90 25.02
MedianCountries with corruption
higher than median 36 49 50.5 45.5
Average aid 25.02 7.47 30.54 27.20
number of countries with
lower than median 36 49 50.5 45.5
Average aid 18.51 6.63 32.26 24.53
Topand Thetopquintilemost 14.4 19.6 20.2 18.2
bottom corrupt countries
quin tiles
Average aid 33.32 11.42 31.92 29.86
The bottom quintile 14.4 19.60 20.2 18.2
Least corrupt countries
Average aid 20.59 6.06 21.01 19.45
Bold numbers indicate that more Corrupt countries had received higher aid.Figure 1:
Aid/GOVT on ICRG index of corruption
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